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DCI/IC 74-1817

15 August 1974

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT

: Murphy Commission

- In line with your discussion at lunch today with Fisher Howe of the Commission, I have reviewed the attached request from Mr. Bacchus in an effort to find how we can be most helpful to him. As I understand your informal agreement with Mr. Howe, we will try to be as forthcoming as possible under the ground rules acceptable to State and CIA security. Moreover, it will not be necessary for any of Mr. Bacchus' research staff to have actual access to the documents or estimates to which they refer. They can instead simply be briefed from those documents as appropriate.
- I have talked with the Office of Security, and they can endeavor to give Mr. Oldenburg (as well as Mr. George) their blessing for an operational SECRET clearance on a need-to-know basis with the same explicit understanding that they have with State Department, i.e., the use of such information will not include the citation of materials or individuals. For them to move forward on these two men, as well as on any others who come along, they ask that we give them a formal request and provide as much identifying data on the people as possible. They could probably clear both men within a few days, if we can start immediately. I have initiated the action and will advise Mr. Howe that we are taking such steps.
- With particular reference to Mr. Oldenburg's request, I will discuss with the DDI Questions 3, 4 and 5 which you feel can and should be handled by DDI officers on a SECRET level and in a general, broad way. Question 2 is a matter for the Department of Defense, and I will prepare a note to Fisher from you to that effect. Since Question 1

is of such sensitivity throughout this Agency, I will seek further judgments as you suggest from DDI and include comments to Fisher on this question as well. I will also be present as much as possible during any conversations with Murphy Staff people and ensure that the ground rules are precisely understood on a case-by-case basis.

4. I will, of course, follow your instructions to deal through the Deputy Directors and the Office heads and will not initiate any contacts without their clearance.

Coordination Staff/Secretariat

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Attachment As stated

Approved For the Conduct of Foreign Policy

2025 M STREET, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 August 15, 1974

TAT		Intelligence Community Staff Washington, D. C.
TAT		Dear Ms.
	·	As you'requested in your conversation with Bill Bacchus of our staff, Phil Oldenburg's needs for information in conjunction with our "Coordination in Complex Settings" Study include the following:
		1. Some sense of Intelligence Community estimates of the net gains and losses to the United States of the expansion of the Diego Garcia base, with reference to (a) countering Soviet naval growth; (b) relations with South Asia; (c) the ability to intervene, if necessary, in the Persian Gulf Region.
		2. After-the-fact evaluations of the effect of United States' arms transfers to South Asia (particularly those in 1969 and 1970) in terms of (a) the impact on the stability of the region; (b) the growth or decline of United States influence on the governments of India and/or Pakistan.

5. Confirmation or correction of the asserted existence of a CIA estimate in April, 1971 suggesting that a likely outcome of the tensions between East and West Pakistan would be the break-up of Pakistan. This would be important as a means of assessing whether policy makers were in possession of the best available information.

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Ms.

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On another subject, let me confirm to you that Professor Alexander George holds a current SECRET clearance in conjunction with his status as a RAND Corporation consultant. As the proposal for his project which you already have indicates, Professor George's interests on behalf of the Commission are in the general area of impediments to rational decision making, whether they arise from psychological or physiological stress, imperfect information, effects of small group decision making or related factors. Thus, Professor George would be interested in consulting with Intelligence Community experts who have devoted attention to such topics. He would not be looking at specific policies or decisions, nor to specific examples of individual or government performance.

Let me emphasize again my conviction that officers of the Intelligence Community are in a position to be of great assistance to the Commission and the importance of their contributions if we are to meet our own responsibilities.

Thank you very much for your assistance and should any questions arise concerning the Oldenburg or George request, please contact Bill Bacchus at 254-9850.

Fisher Howe

Deputy Executive Director

Executive Registry

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DCI/IC 74-0926

9 MAR 1974

The Honorable Robert D. Murphy, Chairman Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy 2025 M Street, N. W. Washington, D. C. 20506

Dear Ambassador Murphy:

At the request of the Commission, my representatives have reviewed the transcript of my testimony before the Commission with the objective of identifying all matters which are classified. Statements which we wish you to hold in the highest confidentiality are underlined in red in your copy. I ask that you make certain that these matters do not appear in the public record. All other portions of the transcript can be considered open to your use for any purpose.

I would like to call to your attention that occasionally throughout the transcript we have underlined the remarks of some of the Commissioners, indicating that we consider those statements to include classified material. This has been done for two reasons. First, because the member's question or statement alludes quite specifically to a part of my own testimony which is classified. Second, and mainly with respect to your remarks and some of Senator Mansfield's, prior knowledge of intelligence matters by members of the Commission revealed substance which would have been treated as classified had I made the remarks myself. In the latter cases, I am sure that we were all sharing information and past experiences quite openly because we respected the confidentiality of the session.

I want to thank you for the courtesy which you have displayed throughout the hearings and in prior and subsequent staff contact. It has been a most interesting experience for me.

Sincerely,

Zs/ Bill

W. E. Colby

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	DCI/IC 74-0926, dated:	7.
TAT	DCI/IC/CS/is (1/25/74)	
	Distribution:	
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DCI/IC 74-0958 19 February 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

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Declassification of Some of Your Murphy Commission Testimony


- 1. Subsequent to your appearance before the Murphy Commission, on 19 November, the Commission staff requested that we review the transcript of your remarks and differentiate for them the classified and unclassified portions. For your information, they have taken this same approach with most of the witnesses who have made reference to classified information in their testimony.
- 2. The transcript which appears in the attached notebook has been reviewed by the DDI, the DDO, the DDS&T, the General Counsel, and by me. We have underlined in red all portions which are classified, except for a few points which are now treated within the Agency as classified but which you may now wish to troat as unclassified. The particular portions to which I draw your attention are:

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- a. On page 9, the first full paragraph beginning with 'That was a way of expressing the charge of conducting espionage..." Is there today a good reason to deny that the US has a mechanism for directing the conduct of espionage?
- b. On page 14, the first full paragraph on the page. Do we have any obligation to protect Brookings or the Forum, or are these appearances widely known?

c. On page 57, beginning in the first paragraph with "This, of course, is why we got into the war in Laos..." and carrying through the middle of page 58; then picking up again after certain deletions on page 58 with the paragraph When the cease fire was arranged last January..." and carrying to Mr. Murphy's first question on page 59. This section describes how CIA got into the Laos war, etc. Can some or all of this go into the open record to begin to set matters straight?



4. For your information, the Commission is developing a follow-up study plan which the staff members will pursue. I know that one area on which they would like a clearer fix is covert action.

their copy of the transcript to match yours.

5. I recommend that you sign the attached letter to Ambassador Murphy, transmitting the sanitized text. I will carry it to the Commission when I go to mark their transcript.

DCI/IC/CS

Attachment: as stated

Executive Registry

DCI/IC 74-0927

25 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel

SUBJECT:

Declassification of the Murphy Commission

Transcript

- 1. The attached transcript reflects the views of the DDI, DDO, and DDS&T on what would have to be deleted to make the subject transcript unclassified. There are a few areas in which it is clear that the subject matter is now classified, but in which the directorates are willing to have the DCI make his remarks unclassified if he should choose to do so. They are as follows:
 - a. On page 9, the first full paragraph beginning with "That was a way of expressing the charge of conducting espionage..." Is there today a good reason to deny that the US has a mechanism for directing the conduct of espionage?
 - b. On page 14, the first full paragraph on the page.

 Do we have any obligation to protect Brookings or the ______

 Forum, or are these appearances widely known?
 - c. On page 57, beginning in the first paragraph with "This, of course, is why we got into the war in Laos..." and carrying through the middle of page 58; then picking up again after certain deletions on page 58 with the paragraph "When the cease fire was arranged last January..." and carrying to Mr. Murphy's first question on page 59. This section describes how CIA got into the Laos war, etc. Can some or all of this go into the open record to begin to set matters straight?
 - d. On page 59 at the bottom, and 60 at the top, the discussion of Soviet obligations to warn the US about Mid-East hostilities. Any reason the DCI doesn't want this in and attributed to him?

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	2. All other sections underlined in red should be considered by the Commission as classified TOP SECRET.	
	3. I recommend that the matters in paragraph 1 shows	
	be referred to the DCI, along with the attached letter to the Commission from him. I can deliver the letter and mark the Commission transcript next week.	
	DCI/IC/C\$	
	Attachments:	
·	 Murphy Commission Testimony (notebook) Letter from DCI to the Commission 	
25X1	DCI/IC/CS/:ho (1/25/74)	
	Distribution: Orig - addressee	
	1 - DDCI / 1 - ER	
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	1 - DDI 1 - DDS&T	
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